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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The findings in this report conducted by INTERSOS and MMP indicate that, although 
the individual contexts in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece are unique, challenges evident 
for Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC) across all three countries do bear 
common themes. Despite legislative discrepancies, it is clear that the best interests of 
the child, as set out in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, are consistently 
violated by: inconsistent or non-existent implementation of updated procedural 
safeguards; strained institutional capacity; and both state-level and public scepticism 
around ‘security concerns’ posed by UASC. 
The findings also demonstrate how motivations for irregular migration appear commonly 
driven by the need for security when threatened by forced conscription or exploitation 
and/or when seeking better livelihoods opportunities. Furthermore, institutional capacity, 
or allocation of adequate funds for the protection of UASC, remains strained in all three 
contexts. When coupled with poorly coordinated monitoring and the unavailability of 
UASC-disaggregated data, the protection space for this vulnerable group shrinks even 
further. 
Legal status challenges, with regards to regular entry and stay, sit at the intersection of 
an intricately linked chain of successive protection risks for UASC in Jordan, Lebanon 
and Greece. In Jordan, this is characterised by the post-2014 policy shift requiring that 
refugees, including minors, registered after this date reside within formalised camps, 
contrasted by the reality that at least 80% of this community live in host communities. 
In Lebanon, UASC are prevented by law from entering and residing within the country 
regularly, due to the required presence of an adult guardian at all junctures. Meanwhile, in 
Greece, the medical inaccuracy and poor implementation of the age assessment process 
continue to threaten the right of UASC to access asylum and child-specific support.
Such legal status challenges place UASC at risk of arrest, detention and in the cases 
of Greece and Jordan, relocation and even deportation. Consequently, the threat of 
this compels UASC to avoid accessing humanitarian support or registering officially 
with national authorities, further compounding the quantitative ambiguity around their 
presence or movement patterns. This immediately impacts on their access to education, 
healthcare, psychosocial support, shelter and legal representation, again exacerbating 
their already acute vulnerability. In order to survive, void of the support to which they are 
entitled, findings indicate that many UASC turn to a series of negative coping mechanisms 
including child labour, transactional sex, working irregularly and incurring unfeasible levels 
of debt.
The contradiction in the criminalisation of children as adults throughout the migration 
process, contrasted by their lack of voice in decisions concerning their wellbeing, must 
be reconciled. A child protection approach that continues to centralise the vulnerability 
of UASC - without recognising their agency within the decision-making process, including 
their decision to move, service provision they receive and policy decisions that affect 
them - will ultimately fall short of insuring their best interests. 
5O N  M Y  O W N
Acronyms 
AP   -  Associated Press
ASC   -  Asylum Seeker Certificate 
BID   -  Best Interest Determination
CRC   -  Convention on the Rights of the Child
EKKA   -  National Centre for Solidarity 
EU   -  European Union
fYRoM    -  The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GoJ   -  Government of Jordan
GoL   -  Government of Lebanon
GSO   -  General Security Office 
ILO   -  International Labour Organisation
IOM   -  International Organisation of Migration
IS   -  Islamic State
ISIS   -  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISF   -  Internal Security Forces
ITS   -  Informal Tented Settlement(s)
JMD   -  Joint Ministerial Decision
MoE   -  Ministry of Education
MoH   -  Ministry of Health
MoI   -  Ministry of Interior
MoU   -  Memorandum of Understanding
MMP   -  Mixed Migration Platform
NCFA   -  National Council for Family Affairs
NGO   -  Non-Governmental Organisation
PoC   -  Persons of Concern
SGBV   -  Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
UAC   -  Unaccompanied Children
UASC   -  Unaccompanied and Separated Children
UAM   -  Unaccompanied Minors
UN   -  United Nations 
UNICEF  -  United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNHCR   -  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UVE   -  Urban Verification Exercise
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1.1. Focus, methodology and research goals
The overall objective of this report is to provide evidence to better inform decision-
making within the humanitarian and policy-making communities regarding the protection 
of children on the move. It aims to document the risks and vulnerabilities that children 
on the move face when they travel unaccompanied or separated from their primary 
caregivers. Its primary aims are: 
a. To improve knowledge and facilitate the exchange and provision of information 
on children on the move;
b. To help strengthen UASC protection policies, identifying best practices and gaps.
Data and information were collected directly from children on the move, documenting 
their experiences and their understanding of exploitation. The investigation was carried 
out in countries where INTERSOS implements child protection programmes and has 
direct access to children on the move, both in reception centres, Informal Tented 
Settlements (ITS), and child-friendly spaces in camps. Data collection was conducted 
between January and May 2017 in Thessaloniki and the island of Lesvos in Greece, as 
well as the administrative region of Central Macedonia; in the greater Amman area and 
the northern governorates of Irbid and Karak in Jordan; and in the governorates of Beirut, 
Bekaa and Mount Lebanon in Lebanon.
The research also relied on interviews with key stakeholders1, as well as with local 
authorities. The wide range of data collected from a variety of stakeholders, combined 
with triangulation strategies helped to increase the validity and the reliability of the 
findings.
Initially, the research team conducted a brief, but comprehensive survey of the existing 
UASC literature on the research question in the selected countries in order to identify 
the main protection issues faced by UASC and prepare for the primary research. Data 
was subsequently collected through a series of in-depth interviews with UASC, as well 
as semi-structured interviews with relevant actors in charge of UASC protection, and 
other stakeholders. Since patterns of UASC displacement to countries neighbouring 
Syria and from the Middle East to Greece are contextually specific, questions were 
tailored accordingly and research tools were likewise context-specific. This strategy 
allowed for a comprehensive understanding of the implementation of protection 
procedures. Furthermore, the research explored how the various reception procedures 
for UASC were experienced by the children themselves, the authorities in charge of 
their protection and other relevant stakeholders involved in the process.
1 Refer to full list of stakeholders, detailed on Acknowledgements page.
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A senior researcher conducted nine focus groups in the target countries with UASC 
ranging from 13 to 17 years of age (groups of four to six children). The interviews and 
focus groups were conducted in the language of the interviewed person; interpreters 
and cultural mediators were employed for this purpose. The researchers also ensured 
that a range of different nationalities were represented in the interviews. Additionally, 
with the help of local authorities, the research team sought access to underrepresented 
groups. Six female UASC were interviewed in total in Lebanon. The availability of 
female respondents is reflective of the relatively low percentage of unaccompanied and 
separated girls in the total migrant flows in the selected countries.
Data collection was carried out thanks to the support of MMP and in line with field-
tested INTERSOS confidentiality procedures. Throughout the research, ethical standards 
for studies involving minors were consistently respected: UASC were approached 
and interviewed in accordance with child protection principles and in the presence of 
specialised staff who made sure their best interests were the priority at all times.2
Finally, there were two main limitations with regards to the research:
1. Despite an understanding of the risk of introducing bias into the research by an 
overrepresentation of male perspectives, the specific displacement patterns of 
the selected countries incurred a focus on male minors at the expense of their 
female counterparts. Future research would ideally further disaggregate this topic 
as regards gender analysis, where possible.
2. The researcher was not granted access to UASC in Jordan, therefore, the 
research focus shifted to analyse the correlation between documentation 
complexities and family separation. As a result, findings in this section regarding 
UASC in particular were collated and triangulated with the help of protection 
specialists. Findings in the Jordan chapter otherwise examine protection 
challenges for minors at risk of becoming unaccompanied or separated due to 
legal status challenges.
1.2. Background
Who are Unaccompanied and Separated Children (UASC)?
Unaccompanied and Separated Children are minors moving, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
for a variety of reasons, who become separated from their parents or other caregivers. 
2 All research regulations of the countries where research was conducted were respected. Participation in research was always voluntary. 
When first approached, participants were provided with information about the consent form and the information sheet in a language 
and in terms understandable to them. Where appropriate, specific queries and responses provided by the lead researcher were also 
noted in writing and subsequently signed by both the enumerator and the research participant, and then attached to the consent form. 
The anonymity of the research participants has been preserved through the use of pseudonyms for all interviewees. Finally, only the 
researchers had access to the raw research data.
Interviews Jordan Lebanon Greece Total
Children 3 12 4 19
Local authorities 0 2 2 4
 Other stakeholders 10 12 21 43
 Total 13 26 27 66
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There is, however, no universally accepted definition of UASC. Countries around the 
world have developed different operative definitions for minors on the move, including 
“displaced children”, “unaccompanied minors” and “separated children”. 
As a general rule, many countries appear to be using the definition contained within the 
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). At the international level, 
the CRC defines unaccompanied children as “children […] who have been separated from 
both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or 
custom, is responsible for doing so”.3 As defined in Article 1 of the Convention, separated 
children are minors “who have been separated from both parents, or from their previous 
legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other relatives. These 
may, therefore, include children being accompanied by adult family members”.4 Even 
upon agreement of terms, there is not necessarily agreement on interpretation, leading 
to a diverse range of rights and entitlements for minors, and equally challenges in data 
collection and coherent monitoring of UASC migration patterns. 
According to recent data, the number of UASC has increased five times over the past six 
years on a global scale.5 In 2016 alone, 100,264 children arrived in Greece (63,920), Italy 
(28,223), Spain (1,674) and Bulgaria (6,447), fleeing severe economic distress, political 
unrest, and warfare – more than one third were unaccompanied or separated children.6 
Most UASC arriving to Europe by sea in 2016 were boys between 15 and 17 years of age. 
92% of the 28,223 children who arrived in Italy were unaccompanied (25,846). The top 
countries of origin for UASC reaching Europe in 2016 were, in order, Syria, Afghanistan 
and Iraq, with smaller but significant numbers from Gambia, Eritrea, and other African 
countries.7 These figures, however, only represent a fraction of the total number of UASC 
3 Article 1 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
4 Comment 6 of Section 7-8 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
5 UNICEF (2017) A Child is a Child: Protecting Children on the Move from Violence, Abuse and Exploitation
6 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends in 
2016
7 Ibid.
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who remain outside their country of origin or their place of habitual residence. Many 
UASC do not register with the authorities because they are unable or afraid to do so, 
or they have been advised by family members, peers or smugglers to continue on to 
another destination. Others who have been exploited or trafficked are unable to contact 
the authorities in Europe - in many instances, unaccompanied or separated children may 
not appear in official statistics because they did not apply for international protection for 
these reasons. Conversely, they may be statistically ‘invisible’ if they have been referred 
to specialised child trafficking procedures.
1.3. UASC protection
A number of reports and studies have shown how unaccompanied and separated minors 
are particularly at risk of abuse, detention, exploitation, neglect, and violence.8 To protect 
children against threats of this kind, the UN General Assembly adopted the CRC in 1989. 
This convention is one of the most widely ratified international treaties for working with 
UASC, and its provisions are to be applied “without discrimination of any kind, irrespective 
of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or 
other status” (Article 2). In September 2016, the member states of the UN reaffirmed 
their commitment to addressing the specific needs of children travelling as part of large 
movements of refugees and migrants,9 especially children who are unaccompanied or 
separated from their families, in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.10 
The CRC has four core principles: the best interests of the child (Article 3); non-
discrimination (Article 2); the right to life and survival and development (Article 6); and 
the right to be heard (Article 12). These four principles should ideally form the linchpin 
of any state or community-based policy on UASC. In addition to this normative and 
legal framework, the convention delineates a number of fundamental rights aimed at 
safeguarding the psychological, cognitive and neurobiological development of children 
and adolescents. It also pays particular attention to the role of the family in providing care 
for children, the special protection needs of children deprived of their family environment 
and the particular protection needs of asylum-seeking and refugee children.
Despite the fact that the CRC was ratified by 195 countries - every member of the 
UN, except the United States of America - children continue to be subject to abuse, 
violence and discrimination throughout the migration process. Unaccompanied children 
are especially vulnerable during their journeys due to the challenges associated with 
embarking on a migration journey without an adult caregiver. UASC also suffer because 
those actors in charge of their protection are often faced with legislative climates that 
sideline or misinterpret their best interests.
8 (Ed.) Kanics, J., Senovilla Hernández, D., Touzenis, K., (2007) UNESCO, Migrating Alone: Unaccompanied and Separated Children’s 
Migration to Europe; Oxfam (2016) The impact of protection interventions on unaccompanied and separated children in humanitarian 
crises: An evidence synthesis protocol; UNICEF, REACH (2017) Situation Overview: Unaccompanied and Separated Children in 
Transit in Ventimiglia, Italy, February 2017; Save the Children (2017) Out of Sight, Exploited and Alone: A joint brief on the situation for 
unaccompanied and separated children in Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoia, Serbia and Croatia, April 2017
9 This report builds on Jørgen Carling’s argument against the separation of “migrant” from “refugee”. Such a clear-cut distinction 
undermines the humanitarian principles that should inspire our response to emergencies and obscure the complex motivations 
that guide someone’s journey to another country. As such, this report uses the inclusivist definition, detailed in the UN Department 
of Economics and Social Division’s Recommendations on Migration Statistics report, of a migrant as “any person who changes his 
or her country of usual residence” to indicate any person who moves to another country, under different circumstances and for a 
variety of reasons. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division (1998) Statistical Papers, Series M, No. 58, Rev. 1: 
Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1. Carling, J. (2015) Refugees are Also Migrants. All Migrants Matter, 3 
September 2015
10 UN General Assembly (2016) New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, 19 September 2016
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CHAPTER 2: JORDAN11
2.1. Local context 
As of June 2017, over 659,000 Syrians had registered with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Jordan. The influx of Syrians fleeing the war 
makes Jordan the country with the highest per capita rate of Syrian refugees in the 
Middle East region, following Lebanon. Figures are even more striking when the 
Government of Jordan’s (GoJ) claim that the number of Syrian refugees in the country is 
approximately 1.3 million, constituting 20% of its entire population, is taken into account. 
The exodus of Syrian refugees into Jordan has been facilitated by several factors, in 
addition to the longstanding cultural and geographic ties between the two countries. 
Jordan has historically served as a safe haven for forced migrants in the Middle East, 
a role explained by the country’s location and its general openness towards Arab 
migrants.12 Over several decades, waves of refugees have entered Jordan: Palestinian 
refugees in the wake of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948; displaced people 
from the Lebanese Civil War in 1975; and Iraqi refugees from the Gulf War in 1991. Since 
2011, the Jordanian government has also hosted Syrian refugees fleeing their war-torn 
country. Most refugees have found shelter in urban centres, such as the capital Amman, 
and the country’s northern border governorates. As of July 2017, only 141,000 registered 
refugees (around 20% of the total refugee population) were living in camps.13  
11 In this chapter and the following, UASC from Syria will be used as examples (as opposed to other nationalities) because they represent 
by far the largest refugee group in Lebanon and Jordan. However, Syrians are neither the only refugee population in the two countries, 
nor necessarily the most vulnerable ones. For instance, several studies have shown more discriminatory policies enacted by Lebanon 
and Jordan against Syrian Palestinian refugees seeking refuge in Lebanon since 2011. UNHCR (2016) The Situation of Palestinian 
Refugees in Lebanon, February 2016 
12 De Bel-Air, F (2007) American University of Cairo, State Policies on Migration and Refugees in Jordan, 23-25 October 2007
13 UNHCR (2017) UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response-Jordan: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal
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O N  M Y  O W N
20%
80%
Registered Syrian refugees in Jordan - April 2017
Camp	  Population
Urban,	   Peri-­‐Urban	  and	  
Rural	  Population
Source: UNHCR (2017) Jordan Factsheet: April 2017 (2017)
By 2014, the GoJ had de facto closed its borders with Syria.14 UNHCR and the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) concur that almost no new refugee arrivals 
have been recorded since then, and that only a very limited number of Syrians have 
entered the country - women, children and civilians with urgent medical needs, who had 
previously been stranded with many other refugees in ‘no man’s land’ between Syria 
and Jordan, known as the berm.15 Unlike Lebanon and Greece, quantitative reporting on 
UASC entering the country after 2016 has been scarce. The most recent data from the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) indicates that upwards of 3,000 UASC have entered 
Jordan since 2012.16 As a result, the focus of the research conducted in Jordan is centred 
on family separation of minors that occurs as a result of documentation complexities 
incurred by the GoJ’s recent changes to legal status policies.
2.2. Legal framework
Jordan signed the CRC in 1990 and ratified it by Royal Decree in 1999. It is not, however, a 
signatory to the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees. The country receives refugees 
and asylum seekers within the framework of its Law of Residency and Foreigners’ Affairs17 
and it is subject to the principle of non-refoulement18 under customary law. Moreover, 
refugees can receive temporary protection from UNHCR under the framework of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 1998 by the Jordanian Ministry of Interior. 
Yet under international law, Jordan has no legal obligation to accept and assist Syrians 
fleeing war. 
Concerning legislative developments that impact children in general, and UASC in 
particular, the Jordanian Government adopted the Juvenile Law in 2014,19 whereby all 
foster care procedures relating to children being cared for by non-relatives are processed 
through the Juvenile Court. Other relevant existing laws and policies concerning the care 
14 Achilli, L. (2016) Back to Syria? Conflicting patterns of mobility among Syrian refugees in Jordan, 3 February 2016
15 Amnesty International (2015) Syria-Jordan border: 75,000 refugees trapped in desert no man’s land in dire conditions, 15 September 
2015; European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) (2017) ECHO Factsheet. Jordan: Syria Crisis, January 2017
16 IRC (2016) Alone in Azraq: a Syrian teenager’s story, 18 April 2016
17 Jordan Department of Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs (1973) Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners Affairs
18 Article 2 (1) of the MoU between UNHCR and the Government of Jordan states: “The principle of non-refoulement should be respected 
that no refugee seeking asylum in Jordan will be returned to a country where his life of freedom could be threatened because of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. Government of Jordan; UNHCR (1998) 
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Jordan and UNHCR, 17 March 1998
19 Ministry of Social Development, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan (2014) Law No. 32 of 2014 concerning Juvenile Law, 2 
November 2014
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and protection of children include Sharia Law; the Personal Status Law (revised in 2010); 
and the Ihtidan System (1967).20 Furthermore, the Jordanian National Plan of Action for 
Children (2003-2013) has a strong focus on protecting children in difficult circumstances, 
and has a focus on children without parental care. The Special Juvenile’s Law was 
enacted in 1951, and was soon followed by the Jordanian Juveniles Law No. 16 in 1954. In 
1968, Law No. 24 further incorporated the principles and premises that take into account 
the nature of childhood. It included definitions and procedures that consider the child as 
a human being who passes through developmental states during which they develop an 
awareness of the nature of their actions. Among the more recently enacted legislation 
concerning juveniles are laws that allow all children and/or their representatives to bring 
cases to the domestic courts to challenge the violation of a child’s rights - if the victim of a 
crime has not yet reached 15 years of age, however, the complaint must be lodged by the 
child’s guardian. Evidently, UASC are faced with a lack of guardianship that complicates 
their representation when seeking access to justice.
2.3. UASC protection challenges and vulnerabilities
Legal status challenges 
During the second half of 2014, the GoJ started to more closely regulate the freedom of 
movement of UASC and more generally, of Syrian refugees, within urban areas. On 14 
July 2014, it instructed UNHCR to stop issuing Asylum Seeker Certificates (ASC) to Syrians 
who had left the camps without proper exit documentation. This new policy has affected 
many UASC, particularly in their ability to access health and education services, in turn 
increasing their vulnerability. ASCs are generally, although inconsistently, acquired prior 
to the issuance of the Jordanian Ministry of Interior’s (MoI) service card, which grants 
refugees access to public healthcare and education services in host communities, and 
needs to be renewed on a yearly basis. Reports are conflicting as to the obligatory nature 
of the ASC in obtaining the MoI card - as possession of an ASC determines whether you 
are regarded as a registered or non-registered refugee - with status details reportedly 
detailed on the card itself (RR indicating registered refugee and NRR indicating non-
registered refugee). As of early 2015, the cost of renewing the card was around $70 per 
person, rendering it inaccessible to large and lower-income households. As a result of 
advocacy by the international community, procedures were streamlined and fees for the 
issuance and renewal of MoI cards were reduced.21 Nonetheless, by the end of August 
2016, nearly 42% of registered refugees living outside the camps - including UASC - still 
lacked a valid MoI card.22
Lack of proper documentation constitutes a matter of concern for displaced communities, 
as the refugee population that is not registered and/or documented is increasingly 
perceived as a threat to national security. Terrorist attacks at the Berm and in Karak have 
exacerbated this perception and police checks and controls are on the rise.23 Those who 
are not in possession of documentation frequently face administrative detention, while 
background checks are conducted.
Field research revealed reports of authorities treating minors as adults in legal terms, 
despite existing child-specific legislation and clearly delineated procedural channels. 
Minors caught working illegally risk forcible relocation to camps and, if accused of 
20 The Ihtidan system places children with foster families under Sharia Law, constituting “alternative family-based care for children unable 
to live with their immediate relatives”. Save the Children (2015) Kinship Care Report: Syrian Refugee Children in Jordan, March 2015
21 UNHCR (2016) Frequently Asked Questions: Work Permits for Syrian Refugees in the Urban Environment in Jordan, 14 April 2016
22 NRC (2016) Securing Status; Syrian refugees and the documentation of legal status, identity, and family relationships in Jordan, 8 
November 2016
23 Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) (2017) Jordan and the Berm - Rukban and Hadalat: 2017-2018, March 2017
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affiliation with armed groups in Syria, can be deported. In this sense, minors - and adults 
alike - seldom have the possibility to appeal the decision and are generally not provided 
with legal counsel during this process; without parental care, UASC have even fewer 
chances to prevent deportation. While there is no data available on the number of forcibly 
relocated and deported children, interviews with key informants seem to suggest that this 
trend is on the rise.24 
24 INTERSOS (2017) Protection Monitoring on Forced Encampment and Deportation in Jordan; Associated Press (AP) (2017) Number of 
Syrians Deported from Jordan Spikes, 17 May 2017
58%
42%
Registered Syrian refugees in Jordan
With a valid MoI card
Without a valid MoI card
 Source: Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (2016) Securing Status; Syrian refugees and the documentation of 
legal status, identity, and family relationships in Jordan, 8 November 2016
Entry/Legal Status Challenges
Nour was 10 years old when she came to Jordan with her father, mother and two 
brothers. It was 2012, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. According to Nour’s father, 
it was easier at that time: “Jordan was very welcoming, the borders were open. The 
difficult part was arriving to Jordan. We travelled down a long and dangerous road. 
However, when we reached Jordan, the worst part was behind us. We were transported 
from the frontier to Raba’ al Sarhan [the transit centre jointly managed by the Jordanian 
government and UNHCR]. There we were registered with UNHCR and then transferred 
to Zaatari…It was easier back then”. After registering with UNHCR, the family settled 
down on the outskirts of Amman. Here, Nour’s mother gave birth to a third child. Two 
years after they entered Jordan, however, Nour’s mother had to move back to Syria to 
visit her own mother who was severely sick. Given her ill health, Nour’s grandmother 
wanted to see her daughter for the last time. 
Nour’s mother travelled to Syria with her youngest child, leaving Nour behind with 
the rest of the family. A few months later, after the death of her own mother, Nour’s 
mother sought to rejoin her family in Jordan, yet the border was already closed. 
Despite several attempts, Nour’s mother never managed to cross the border back into 
Jordan. Nour and her father and brother continued to live together until the Jordanian 
authorities caught the father residing without an updated MoI card. Soon after, he 
was deported back to Syria, and Nour and her brother were taken in by an aunt living 
in Jordan. In clear violation of the CRC principle outlining the detrimental impact of 
separating minors from their parents, unless for their own protection, Nour and her 
brother became separated children.
14
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Arrest, detention, and encampment
Although Jordan recently revised its juvenile justice system to match international 
standards,25 minors on the move are often arbitrarily detained without access to legal 
counsel. Data collected in mid-2017 confirmed that minors are particularly vulnerable to 
being arrested and held at police stations and juvenile detention centres for working 
without authorisation. Furthermore, there are indications that a growing number are 
then forcibly relocated to a shelter for minors in Azraq Camp. Interviews with refugees 
and humanitarian actors have revealed that the only legal pathway for these detained 
unaccompanied minors to be reunited with their families is through the family reunification 
process. If the minor’s parents and/or relatives reside in Azraq Camp, the reunification 
procedure is usually carried out without delay. If the child has relatives living legally 
outside the camp, however, reunification procedures are less clear and take longer; 
reunification in these cases is based on the possession of valid documentation, not on 
the best interests of the child. Indeed, if a minor has parents residing irregularly within a 
host community and relatives staying inside the camps, s/he is reunited with the relatives 
in the camps. Furthermore, if the relatives of the minor are residing irregularly in a host 
community, the reunification procedure does not apply, and the children are held in the 
shelter indefinitely, or at least until they turn 18 - when they should be moved into the 
general population in Azraq Camp. 
This forced encampment policy has exposed minors to considerable risks. To begin with, 
forcible relocation to camps can cause family separation. Nuclear families are frequently 
broken apart and children are separated from their parents, despite living in the same 
country. Field research for this report revealed multiple cases of children who have 
been separated from their families residing in host communities and who were either 
relocated to a specialised shelter in Azraq camp or placed with their grandparents in its 
vicinity. Furthermore, Azraq camp’s isolation from services and livelihood opportunities 
exacerbates its residents’ vulnerability. Its harsh climate exposes minors to a number of 
respiratory diseases. Many children have also reported concerns regarding their lack 
of security and inter-community tensions. With prolonged waiting periods for family 
reunification ranging from months to years, children being held in specialised centres 
in the camp’s vicinity often opt to escape the centre at night, with all the dangers this 
journey poses, running the risk of becoming migrants with an irregular status.
25 ILO (2014) Elimination of child labour, protection of children and young persons, 2 November 2014
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Detention
Khaled and Mohammed, two brothers from Dara’a, 16 and 18 years old respectively, 
settled with their family in northern Jordan in 2014. In early 2016, they were caught by 
the police working in a pastry factory without a work permit. Mohammed was sent to 
jail, while his younger brother Khaled was sent to a juvenile detention centre. After six 
days, during which the family struggled to locate them, the two brothers were reunited 
in the UNHCR registration center in Rabaa al Sarhan and were eventually relocated to 
Azraq camp. 
In the camp, the two brothers found themselves in a dire situation: accommodated 
in a caravan, they struggled to access services, having to walk several kilometres in 
extreme heat to reach shops and water. Feeling like detainees, they had to cope with 
the trauma of being separated from their parents and siblings, and being held in such 
a remote, inhospitable location in the desert. In order to support themselves, they 
borrowed money from others, incurring debts in the process.
After three months in Azraq, the two brothers eventually obtained a leave permit, re-
joined their family and never returned to the camp. Under the custody of his brother, 
Khaled qualified as a separated - but not unaccompanied - child and could, therefore, 
be housed with his brother in one caravan, joining him on the leave obtained via the 
official permit system. Unfortunately, in late 2016, Mohammed was caught for a second 
time by the police. This time he had no MoI card (his original MoI card having been 
invalidated at Azraq camp and replaced with an Azraq camp card): he was eventually 
deported to Syria under ambiguous circumstances.
Access to services
UASC face significant challenges in accessing basic services.26 For example, public 
hospitals supported by the UN provided free healthcare to Syrian refugees for three 
years after the beginning of the Syrian conflict. This service, however, overburdened the 
country’s public health capacity. Since July 2014, primary healthcare services have been 
available to all registered Syrians at reduced prices, but only upon the presentation of a 
health certificate, which is given by the GoJ to all Syrian refugees upon presentation of a 
valid MoI card. The certificate, however, only covers a limited range of health conditions 
and services. With regards to obtaining the documentation that is necessary for minors to 
access services, the lack of influence that children tend to have on legal status decisions 
taken by their parents or guardians increases their vulnerability.
In terms of access to education, a number of issues also create barriers to enrolment and 
attendance, ranging from financial constraints and restriction of movement, to structural 
weaknesses in the Jordanian education system.27 Although the Jordanian Ministry of 
Education (MoE), as part of the Jordan Compact of mid-2016, decided that Syrian children 
without legal documentation should be allowed to enrol in public schools as of the 
Autumn 2016 semester, evidence suggests that the implementation of this decision has 
been uneven across the country.28 As a result, several public schools still require refugee 
children to provide an MoI card in order to be admitted, a problematic requirement for 
26 Amnesty International (2016) Living on the Margins - Syrian Refugees in Jordan Struggle to Access Health Care, 23 March 
2016 
27 Ibid.
28 The Government of Jordan (2016) The Jordan Compact: A New Holistic Approach between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the 
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many UASC living outside of the official registration system. Furthermore, despite such 
policies permitting the entry of undocumented UASC into the education system, evidence 
suggests that the motivation to enrol or attend is still affected by fear of apprehension 
by the authorities on the way to school, due to missing documentation.29 Our findings 
conclude that the difficulty in obtaining relevant documentation for service access 
also compels UASC in particular to revert to negative coping mechanisms, including 
registration with non-family members upon entry or marriages of convenience.
An additional barrier among refugees - adults and minors alike - to obtaining legal 
documentation and, therefore, access to public services, is the risk of being apprehended 
and relocated to camps while renewing valid legal documentation. This seems to 
be caused mainly by police officers’ - intentional or unintentional - disregard for the 
procedures in place. Authorities often require documentation that, according to new 
regulations, is no longer needed. Interviews with humanitarian staff have revealed 
many cases of  ‘deportation by mistake’. According to our findings, police stations 
and governorate officials have detained and, in a few cases, deported individuals in 
possession of regular documentation. Even though UNHCR is currently supporting police 
stations through monitoring visits and training sessions, this situation of inconsistency has 
ultimately fostered refugee distrust and bitterness toward the authorities. Several cases 
of family separation were witnessed during field research, including cases of parents who 
approached police stations for renewal and where they were subsequently arrested for 
documentation irregularities and relocated to the camp in the matter of hours, leaving 
their children behind. 
Ultimately, those UASC who are successful in obtaining guardianship or accessing the 
foster system outside of camps still face significant challenges in obtaining the legal 
documentation necessary to access relevant services, due to their irregular migratory 
status, not to mention gender-based and socio-cultural integration issues specific to the 
Middle Eastern context.30  
Child labour
The GoJ agreed in 2016 to formalise work permits for a number of Syrians, 
accommodating them into the labour market. Despite this policy, this issuance of work 
permits for Syrians remains low. By January 2017, according to figures from ILO, the 
number of Syrians with work permits in the country was only 44,90031 and a CARE survey 
of June 2017 stated that only 23% of interviewed Syrian respondents in Jordan reported 
working with a valid work permit.32 Difficulties in accessing work permits continue for 
a number of reasons: employers might not regularise their employees as employing 
irregular migrants is cheaper; prior to receiving a work permit an employee must have 
his/her status in the country regularised; and procedures for obtaining work permits are 
often not well known to refugees. This directly impacts minors, who are compelled to 
work illegally to support their families in situations of precarity, because of these access 
challenges. However, there is no guarantee that formalising the work permit process 
for greater numbers of adult Syrians displaced within Jordan will lead to an immediate 
International Community to deal with the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 7 February 2016
29 Child protection specialists, Mixed Migration Platform Informal Findings Workshop, Amman, Jordan, July 2017
30 It was not possible within the scope of this research to further investigate such integration issues, however several key informant 
interviews with local protection specialists were triangulated to confirm such a conclusion.
31 ILO (2017) Work Permits and Employment of Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Towards Formalising the Work of Syrian Refugees, 28 June 2017
32 CARE International (2017) 7 Years into Exile: How urban Syrian refugees, vulnerable Jordanians and other refugees in Jordan are being 
impacted by the Syria crisis, 20 June 2017
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reduction in the prevalence of child labour or protection concerns.33 Moreover, the 
distinction between “child labour” and “child work” is a crucial one, in order to promote 
the full agency of the child in their given cultural context. It has been noted by other 
humanitarian actors that work is not necessarily perceived as a negative practice for 
children in many parts of the world, but even as a crucial lifeline, by families faced with the 
economic pressures of protracted displacement.34  
Debt levels and child labour, and their associated vulnerabilities, among refugees are on 
the rise, resulting in people more frequently resorting to negative coping mechanisms. 
For example, there are reports of Syrian families arranging marriage for minors at an 
earlier age, a practice often reluctantly used to ensure the economic status of families and 
a safer space for their daughters.35 In 2014, an ILO assessment reported that almost 50% 
of households relied largely or entirely on the income generated by a minor.36 According 
to ILO, the number of child labourers in the country has more than doubled since 2007, 
totalling 69,000 by 2016, an estimated 44,000 of whom were engaged in hazardous 
labour at the time of the report.37 It is thought that the levels of child labour remain 
extremely high, particularly in urban and agricultural settings and in ITS.38 Participation in 
informal sector work puts children at risk of being relocated to camps, as they are under 
the legal age (18 years) for work permit entitlement. Although there are consequences 
for children who are caught working illegally, action is seldom taken against those who 
employ them, despite the presence of legislation that criminalises such a practice.39 
Exclusion of UASC from the education system (either by choice due to a lack of trust 
or involuntarily due to inconsistent education policy implementation and anti-Syrian 
discrimination) can also be correlated to a rise in informal child labour in their current 
context of displacement.40  
33 Ibid.
34 Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) (2017) Underage, Undocumented and Alone: A gap analysis of undocumented unaccompanied and 
separated children on the move in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece, July 2017
35 Un Ponte Per (2012) Comprehensive Assessment on Syrian Refugees Residing In the Community In Northern Jordan
36 ILO (2014) Rapid Assessment on Child Labour in the Urban Informal Sector in Three Governorates of Jordan
37 ILO (2016) National Child Labour Survey 2016 of Jordan: Summary Report on Main Findings, 16 August 2016
38 INTERSOS (2016) Final report on the Findings of the Child Labour Assessment in Informal Tented Settlements (ITS) of Irbid governorate, 
Jordan
39 Ministry of Labour, Government of Jordan (1996) Article 12, Jordanian Labour Law no. (8)
40 MMP, Informal Findings Workshop with protection specialists, Amman, Jordan, July 2017
Child labour
Hamza was 16 years old when he left his village near the Syrian Golan Heights. He 
escaped with his grandparents and three younger sisters in 2013, after the death of 
his parents when his house was bombed. They legally crossed the border into Jordan. 
Here, the family lived together in a crumbling two-bedroom house on the outskirts of 
Irbid, not far from the house his uncle moved into right after the outbreak of the war in 
Syria. The boy worked to support the entire family. In the beginning, his uncle provided 
some financial help. However, this help eventually came to an end, as he exhausted 
his savings. The uncle’s wage was barely enough to cover the needs of his family. As a 
result, Hamza had to drop out of school and find an irregular job as a peddler in a local 
market, placing him at risk of exploitation and detention.
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Discrimination and societal tensions
At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the large influx of refugees was met by 
demonstrations of solidarity, hospitality and tolerance on the part of Jordanians. Family 
ties as well as shared linguistic and cultural traditions facilitated the arrival of Syrian 
refugees. However, the protracted nature of the crisis has affected these relationships.41 
Against this background, UASC seem to have become a focus for reduced Jordanian 
tolerance. Adolescents, male teenagers and young men in their early twenties are 
often labelled as security threats at risk of being recruited by terrorist organisations 
or of becoming radicalised. Informal interviews with the authorities have revealed the 
seemingly pervasive notion that Syrian refugee communities are fertile grounds for the 
proliferation of Islamic State (IS) and Al Nusra Front militants.42 Media sources from 2017 
have cited the link between affiliations of refugees residing in Jordan with militant groups 
in Syria as justification for their deportation by state officials. These sources have also 
reported an alleged spike in deportations following a security incident at the Rukban 
border crossing in June 2016.43 These broader security concerns seem to coincide with 
the current increase in the number of minors arrested and deported to camps.  
 
41 Ibid.
42 Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) (2017) Jordan and the Berm - Rukban and Hadalat: 2017-2018, March 2017
43 Syrians for Truth and Justice (2017) The Kingdom of Jordan Endangers the Lives of Syrian Refugees by Forcibly Deporting them to 
Syria: The Deportation of Refugees to Syria Violates the “Principle of non-Refoulement in International Law”, 5 June 2017; Reuters 
(2017) Forced back to Syria? Jordan’s unregistered refugees fear deportation, 22 February 2017; AP Archive (2017) Number of Syrians 
Deported from Jordan Spikes, 17 May 2017; AP (2017) Aid officials report spike in Jordan’s deportations of Syrian refugees, 12 May 2017 
(this tweet indicates the source of the original article published by AP, which was subsequently removed).
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CHAPTER 3: LEBANON
3.1. Local context 
As is widely known, Lebanon is the country with the highest number of registered 
refugees per capita in the world. Communities of Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Kurds, and 
Sudanese nationals together constitute over a quarter of Lebanon’s total population; 
Syrians alone are said to represent 25% of the total. As of December 2016, the number 
of registered refugees from Syria was just over one million people. Since a significant 
number of refugees are either unregistered or entered the country irregularly following 
increasingly restrictive entry measures, however, the real number is likely to be higher. In 
January 2015, Lebanon ended the open-door policy which had previously allowed Syrian 
refugees easy access to the country and UNHCR was instructed by the government to 
cease registration and the issuing of UNHCR refugee certificates to Syrians.44 
Even though Lebanon has benefitted from the unprecedented expansion in international 
aid and development grants provided to deal with the crisis, the presence of so 
many refugees has proved an economic strain on the country’s resources - including 
competition for jobs, natural resources, services and infrastructure. Increased combat 
activities in Syria have also negatively affected the security situation in Lebanon, fostering 
social tensions between local communities and the refugee population.
44 Despite this halt in official registration, UNHCR are still monitoring new Syrian refugee arrivals to the country. Instead of the previously 
issued registration certificate, Syrians instead receive a code which can still be used to access humanitarian services. Unlike the 
registration certificate, this code is not, however, valid for residency renewal or entry purposes.
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There is no comprehensive data on the number of unaccompanied and separated minors 
in Lebanon. Restrictive policies implemented by the Lebanese government since 2015 
have increased the number of refugees without valid documentation in the territory, 
and consequently heightened the complexity of monitoring and tracking UASC. Many 
avoid the authorities in order to escape detention. One indication of the likely protection 
challenges facing UASC is the number of Syrian child refugees in Lebanon - UNHCR data 
shows that children represented 55% of registered Persons of Concern (PoC) as of June 
2017.45 
According to INTERSOS data in Mount Lebanon,46 for the period spanning January to 
May 2017, the number of UASC increased by a considerable 157%, compared to the same 
period in 2016. 
The number of unaccompanied children alone increased fivefold during this period. 
Triggers for UASC migration differ depending on gender, city of origin and other factors, 
yet many boys leave in order to escape forced conscription (70% of those INTERSOS 
supports, for example) or to support families back home through remittances. Girls may 
be escaping sexual violence or other protection risks in their countries of origin.47
45 As of 6 May 2015, UNHCR Lebanon has temporarily suspended new registration as per Government of Lebanon’s instructions. 
Accordingly, individuals awaiting to be registered are no longer included. UNHCR (2017) UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response - 
Lebanon: Interagency Information Sharing Portal
46 Data taken from INTERSOS Mount Lebanon Case Management database as of 2016 and 2017. Mount Lebanon was selected as most 
unaccompanied children identified by INTERSOS Lebanon were recorded here as opposed to other regions.
47 UNHCR (2014) Refworld, Protection of Refugee Children in the Middle East and North Africa, October 2014
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3.2. Legal framework
Though Lebanon ratified the CRC in 1991, it is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention on Refugees, nor to its 1967 Protocol. The country implements some 
provisions of the 1951 Convention on a voluntary basis and it is bound by the customary 
law principle of non-refoulement. Accordingly, it generally refers to asylum seekers 
as being “displaced”, as “persons registered as refugees by UNHCR” or as “de facto 
refugees”. Yet, the protection offered to refugees is limited in terms of asylum. As a 
consequence of the country’s non-recognition of refugee status, Syrians - including UASC 
- do not have the privilege of specific procedures with regard to their legal status in the 
country. This is particularly true of the renewal and regularisation of legal stay and the 
right to seek asylum. 
3.3. UASC protection challenges and vulnerabilities
In response to the protracted nature of the crisis, the Lebanese government changed its 
policy towards Syrian refugees in recent years and implemented a number of restrictive 
measures. These measures have led to a decline in the living conditions of UASC in the 
country, resulting in myriad protection challenges.
Legal status challenges
All Syrians refugees entering Lebanon must obtain an official document of entry at the 
border and then undergo a complex bureaucratic procedure to regularise their stay. 
Obtaining and maintaining valid legal residency, therefore, is a significant challenge. 
Between January 2015 and June 2016, there were two options for a Syrian national to 
obtain residency: sponsorship by a Lebanese citizen or reliance on a UNHCR registration 
certificate. If a Syrian did not sign a mandatory “pledge not to work”, or if they were found 
by the authorities to be working, those registered with UNHCR would have to renew 
their residency on the basis of a sponsor. From June 2016, the “pledge not to work” was 
replaced by the “pledge to abide by Lebanese Law”, which had to be signed on a yearly 
basis. Moreover, most Syrians wishing to renew a residency permit had to pay a US$200 
fee for each person above the age of 15. A fee waiver introduced by the government in 
late March 2017 exempted some from paying this fee, but it only applies to Syrians who 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Separated
Unaccompanied
UASC	  -­‐ Monthly	  Distribution	  -­‐ 2016UASC - Monthly Distribution - 2016
22
O N  M Y  O W N
entered the country before 2015 and does not currently contain explicit exceptions for 
unaccompanied minors.
Alongside these new border entry regulations, residency renewal procedures have made 
it impossible for unaccompanied and separated minors over 15 to regularise their stay. 
All Syrians over 15 in Lebanon are required to have their own legal residency, separate 
to the residency of their parents. If a minor wishes to undergo residency renewal, a legal 
guardian should be present to sign on their behalf. Unaccompanied minors, therefore, do 
not have any legal pathway to residency, despite being legally required to regularise their 
stay. This gap in the legislative framework is confirmed by the lack of legal residency of all 
unaccompanied minors interviewed within the scope of this research.
As a consequence of these legal status challenges, it is estimated that approximately 70% 
of Syrians - including UASC - currently lack legal residency in Lebanon.48 Those Syrian 
nationals found by the authorities to lack proper documentation are subject to departure 
orders, though these have yet to be enforced as deportations.49 These new regulations, 
however, have effectively facilitated abuse at the hands of security forces and through 
legal sanctions - including financial exploitation, violence, indictment and imprisonment - 
negatively impacting the living conditions of UASC in the country.50
48 Human Rights Watch (2016) Human Rights Watch Submission to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Lebanon; UNHCR (2017) 
Syria Regional Refugee Response - Lebanon: Interagency Information Sharing Portal
49 Personal communication (2017) INTERSOS Lebanon, Protection specialists, June 2017
50 Human Rights Watch (2017) Lebanon: Events of 2016
51 Also referred to as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State (IS), “Daesh” is the 
acronym of “al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham” (lit. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant)
LACK OF DOCUMENTATION
Hamza and Mahmood are both 17 years old. They left Syria at the end of October 2016 
and entered Lebanon a week later, once the restrictive entry and registration measures 
had already come into force (which further complicated the already unfeasible criteria 
and documentation required to regularise their stay in the country). Like many other 
unaccompanied minors before them, they left for a combination of reasons including 
fleeing forced conscription at the hands of Daesh,51 and hoping to find a job to support 
their families. They crossed the border separately and irregularly with the help of 
smugglers. They then met for the first time in Lebanon where they shared a flat together 
with other minors in Bourj Hammoud - a town to the northeast of Beirut. 
At the time of this research project, the boys did not have any source of support apart 
from UNHCR cash assistance that they were receiving. In addition, when they found 
work, a large part of their salary was destined for their relatives in Syria - they became 
a key source of livelihoods for their families back home. Neither had any relatives in 
Lebanon. According to them, however, it was the lack of documents that increased their 
vulnerability more than the absence of adult caregivers. As Hamza pointed out, “we 
live in fear of being arrested and beaten [by the authorities] every time we step outside 
of our homes for food. Even approaching the Syrian embassy is dangerous - a GSO 
(General Security Office) checkpoint is right beside the entrance of the embassy. […] We 
move only in our area in Bourj Hammoud because we know where the GSO checkpoints 
are”. Limiting their movements, however, proved ineffective. Curfews for refugees and 
night raids on refugee homes are frequent in many Lebanese municipalities. During one 
of these raids, Hamza was arrested and temporarily detained.
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Arrest and detention 
As a signatory to the CRC, Lebanon should ensure that children are only ever detained 
in exceptional circumstances for the shortest appropriate period of time and in 
conditions that ensure the rights enshrined in the Convention.52 In Lebanon, however, the 
government approach often risks criminalising the child’s irregularity, rather than providing 
child-focused support and protection services, though this varies across individual 
governorates. Sentencing in the Mount Lebanon area, for example, does reportedly focus 
more on the protection needs of children in custody,53 though it is quite common for 
minors to be arrested for juvenile vagrancy and for a lack of valid documentation. Syrian 
nationals found without proper documentation are often detained and abused by the 
authorities, or find themselves at risk of receiving a deportation order.54 This, in turn, has 
affected Syrians’ freedom of movement. Minors and adults alike fear crossing checkpoints 
or approaching the authorities and public institutions because of the risk of being arrested 
and detained as a result of their irregular status.
Since the entry into force of the aforementioned restrictive measures, minors in Lebanon 
have frequently been held by the authorities at checkpoints and subsequently relocated 
to detention facilities. According to Lebanese law, these centres should hold all minors in 
child-designated areas and only then for short periods of time.55 Exact age-disaggregated 
figures on immigration detention are lacking in available statistics from government or 
human rights organisations. However, our research findings confirm that minors accused 
of affiliation with terrorist groups or other crimes can spend lengthy periods of time in 
detention in the same facilities as the general adult criminal population. Though there are 
no reports of direct mixing within cells in prison detention facilities, this does reportedly 
occur in police stations, due to overcrowding, directly violating Article 37 (c) of the CRC 
and increasing the risk of abuse and violence at the hands of security personnel and 
adult inmates. Moreover, detention of minors as a result of irregular entry or stay tends to 
be limited to a number of days, primarily due to a lack of capacity for the sheer numbers 
of irregularly residing displaced Syrians in the country. In addition, personnel performing 
key functions in the protection of minors have a “duty to report” the presence of irregular 
migrants, including children, to the relevant authorities. Even though we do not know 
whether humanitarian practitioners necessarily comply with this obligation, the regulation 
could discourage minors from accessing key services. 
Shelter and Alternative Care
In the context of Lebanon, unaccompanied minors - even more so than separated 
children - are particularly vulnerable. In Lebanon, they have few options and live alone in 
precarious situations, without any caregivers.
Minors, by law, cannot live without adult supervision in Lebanon. However, there is no 
comprehensive alternative care system in the country that provides foster care, adoption 
or accessible shelters. In addition, access to shelters for Syrian children is restrictive and 
challenging. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, there are very few shelters 
52 UNHCR (2015) Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ Compilation Report
53 MMP, Informal Findings Workshop with protection specialists, Beirut, Lebanon, June 2017
54 While Lebanon is customarily bound by the principle of non-refoulement, local authorities have consistently bypassed this obligation by 
engaging in the practice of “legal deportation” - i.e. issuing deportation orders and demanding that refugees leave. Frangieh, G. (2015) 
Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians, Legal Agenda
55 Lebanese Law, Article 1 of Law 422/2002 (2002) Protection of at-Risk Children or Children Violating the Law
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in the country; those which exist are overcrowded and prioritise vulnerable Lebanese 
children. A Child Protection Officer at the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) noted 
that orphanages in Lebanon, contracted by the government through local NGOs, take 
in Lebanese minors but often refuse their Syrian equivalents. Moreover, UASC often 
voluntarily avoid shelter facilities as staying there could prevent them from working and 
sending remittances back to their families in Syria (which, as previously mentioned, is one 
of the main reasons that unaccompanied children come to Lebanon). 
Unaccompanied minors in Lebanon fall under the protection of the Union for the 
Protection of Juveniles in Lebanon (UPEL). UPEL is a public service association contracted 
by the Government of Lebanon (GoL) to monitor and manage cases of children at risk 
in the country. When minors - including unaccompanied children - need to be placed in 
a shelter, UPEL is mandated by law to inform the juvenile judge (or special prosecutor) 
and require his/her official approval. The judge, however, is required by law to ensure 
that the person is legally residing in the country. If the minor cannot prove legal entry or 
stay, the judge must bring the minor to a police station, putting the child at risk of arrest 
and detention. In practice, however, our research indicates that not all juvenile judges 
inquire about legal residency when placing children in shelters, and that legal protection 
is ultimately determined by the goodwill of the individual judge/official. Furthermore, 
if unaccompanied children without valid residency papers are arrested, or approach 
police stations to report abuse and access justice, the security forces must call UPEL 
to intervene. UPEL tries to guarantee the protection of the minor, which could include 
preventing arrest for a lack of residency, but if an incident occurs outside of UPEL’s 
working hours, police officers are obliged to contact the general prosecutor who is 
mandated to inquire about the minor’s legal status. In summary, unaccompanied minors - 
but also separated children who do not have any legal pathway to residency - are held/
arrested for a lack of residency at the hands of the very institutions that should protect 
them. As a result, they are often detained in violation of national and international law. 
The increase in the number of identified UASC in the last ten months has placed UPEL’s 
capacity to find sufficient shelter under considerable pressure. The current lack of foster 
care or adoption options makes the situation worse. As a result, unaccompanied minors 
are often forced to live alone and unsupervised. UASC now face a lack of space, poor 
access to shelter and a deficit in alternative care options. Indeed, informal sources from 
INTERSOS report that around 20% of Lebanon’s unaccompanied minors live alone on the 
streets, due to unaffordable rent costs.
Access to services
Restrictions on freedom of movement directly infringe upon the ability of UASC to 
access public health care services in host communities. Recent studies in Lebanon 
show how a lack of proper health coverage is one of the greatest challenges faced 
by refugee minors with limited legal status - including UASC; this is something that 
also reflects the current situation in Jordan.56 Another common problem amongst 
UASC is access to education. Barriers range from financial constraints and restrictions 
on movement, to the lack of official legal status. For example, residence permits 
are required for Syrians to access the public education system, in order to obtain 
official diplomas and certificates. As access to the procedures for renewing residency 
56 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP (2016) Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2016, 16 December 2016
25
O N  M Y  O W N
permits and regularising one’s status are challenging for Syrians, and particularly for 
unaccompanied minors, completing education cycles proves almost impossible.57 For 
example, Human Rights Watch estimates that nearly half (over 250,000 children) of 
school-aged Syrians registered in Lebanon do not attend school.58 The large number of 
UASC and children who are not registered add to this figure.
Child labour
In 1993, Lebanon and Syria signed a bilateral agreement that granted reciprocal 
freedom to residents of both countries to stay, work and carry out economic activities. 
Child labour amongst Syrians is a widespread phenomenon, and legally, Syrians who 
are 15 years old and above can work in three sectors: agriculture, construction and 
manual labour. However, due to the difficulties that both UASC and adults face in finding 
an employer who is willing to sponsor them, the issuance of work permits for Syrians 
remains low. As a result of their involvement in irregular labour, many refugees fear 
that they will be detained or deported - a situation that seems to replicate, at least in 
part, a scenario already seen in Jordan. All interviewed UASC claimed to work, mostly 
irregularly and occasionally, for an average of five days a month: a level of employment 
that is hardly sufficient to cover their daily needs. 
Most UASC consulted reported working long and exhausting shifts. Their pay depends 
on a combination of factors including age, gender and legal status. In the Bekaa Valley 
and other rural areas, UASC are often involved in agricultural work. On the other hand, 
this research found that boys in urban areas work mostly in car workshops, restaurants, 
garbage collection and as porters; girls usually sell clothes, undertake domestic work, 
or work in hairdressers, bakeries or supermarkets. Research also revealed that begging 
or hawking is very common for minors. According to a recent study carried out largely 
in Beirut and Tripoli, of a sample of 1,510 mostly Syrian children, “the most common type 
of work is begging (43%), followed by street vending (37%). Incomes averaged US$11 
per day, but vary considerably, from US$9 for begging and windscreen washing to 
US$21-36 for illicit activities or prostitution”.59 
Most interviewed minors claimed to be the main, if not the only, source of family income, 
due to the lack of an adult breadwinner. The high prevalence of child labour amongst 
Syrians is not necessarily perceived by local communities as being inherently negative. 
However, the absence of a caregiver, as well as the lack of valid documentation, seem 
to exacerbate the exposure of UASC to exploitation. In the Bekaa Valley, for example, 
Syrian refugees used to earn around US$10 for five hours of work, prior to the outbreak 
of the Syrian conflict. Minors (including UASC) can today work an entire day in the fields 
for US$4.
57 Terre des Hommes (2016) Because we struggle to survive: Child Labour among Refugees of the Syrian Conflict, May 2016
58 Human Rights Watch (2016) Growing Up Without an Education: Barriers to Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Lebanon
59 UNICEF (2015) Small Hands Heavy Burden: How the Syria Conflict Is Driving More Children into the Workforce, 2 July 2015
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CHILD LABOUR IN THE BEKAA VALLEY
Aisha is 13 years old and the breadwinner in her family. “I am the one who takes care of them,” 
she says when asked who looks after her three brothers. They are all younger than her - six, 
seven and nine years old. Aisha and her brothers came to Lebanon with their parents. They 
entered the country legally on a tourist visa. Their parents took the children to the Bekaa and 
returned to Syria alone, promising to come back in a couple of weeks. They never came back. 
Now, the children live in an unfinished building with coarse, unpainted walls near an ITS in the 
Bekaa Valley. Her father gave them some money, which did not last long. 
Aisha should be in school with her younger brothers but instead spends her days working. 
She first worked in a jam factory six days a week, from six in the morning to six in the 
afternoon. Her already meagre salary of US$8 a day was made even more miserable as 
US$2 had to go to the “shawish” - the coordinator of the tented camp who hires out people to 
nearby farmers, auto repair shops and other employers. “The shawish takes all the girls there”, 
she says. “You cannot be employed if you are younger than 15 years old. However, he has a 
special agreement with the owner: he takes the I.D. of a girl over 15 and allows younger girls to 
work”. 
After a couple of months, Aisha quit her job because she found work on a farm, picking crops 
in a field in the Bekaa Valley. Minors are paid less than adults, so there is a high demand for 
child labour. Aisha explains how the pay was still very low but the working hours had slightly 
improved: “The job was difficult, even more than working in the factory, but at least I could stay 
with my brothers as I finish my shift at 3pm”. Eventually, Aisha left this job because it was too 
exhausting and too far from her house. Luckily their neighbours and others help Aisha and her 
brothers to get by. 
Discrimination and societal tensions
Interviewed minors complained about growing levels of discrimination and racism, 
and reported several incidences of bullying. Assessments suggest that in areas 
accommodating large Syrian refugee populations, relations between Syrian refugees 
and host communities are strained and tend to deteriorate over time.60 At present, there 
remains a gap in the existing literature on how UASC in particular have been affected by 
social tensions of this kind. Some studies show how intercommunal tensions seem to be 
on the rise, and how this phenomenon has increased minors’ isolation.61 For example, a 
growing number of Syrian children - including UASC - have dropped out of school due to 
bullying by their Lebanese peers.62 Research also revealed the widespread belief among 
the most vulnerable Lebanese nationals that Syrians are benefitting from generous 
support from the international community, from which vulnerable Lebanese citizens are 
excluded. Public and media discourse has contributed to a rise in the number of attacks 
on Syrians in Lebanon. In a recent survey, 43% of Syrian refugees - including UASC - 
reported incidents at the hands of authorities or civilians: raids and searches, harassment, 
insults, detention, beating, and extortion.63 
Exploitation 
UASC in Lebanon are often subject to multiple and simultaneous forms of exploitation 
including, and not limited to, labour, monetary and sexual exploitation.64 The residency 
60 Cassidy, J. (2015) The New Yorker, The Economics of Syrian Refugees, 18 November 2015; Thibos, C. (2014) One million Syrians in 
Lebanon: a milestone quickly passed, 3 June 2014
61 World Vision (2015) Social cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan, 10 November 2015
62 Ibid.
63 Thibos, C. (2014) One million Syrians in Lebanon, 3 June 2014
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renewal process itself reportedly opens up refugees to sexual and financial abuses at64 
the hands of security forces, landlords and employers. UASC, as described above, mainly 
work under the worst forms of child labour and are more prone to labour exploitation 
due to their heightened vulnerability and lack of legal recourse. Aware of the reticence 
of UASC in approaching the local authorities, employers often refuse to pay the agreed 
salary or force them to work longer hours under dangerous conditions. Many interviewed 
UASC also complained that landlords took advantage of them by charging high rents for 
inadequate shelter. There are also concerning accounts of Syrian women and underage 
girls being brought to Lebanon through false employment opportunities, held captive in 
slave-like conditions, and ultimately forced into prostitution by criminal rings.65
Interviews with research participants revealed that prior to their departure to Lebanon, many 
UASC were aware of the risks of exploitation in the country, indicating that UASC decided to 
flee Syria for Lebanon despite such an awareness, as their only means of survival. 
The recent policies introduced by the GoL described above have pushed UASC to resort 
to negative coping mechanisms. Recent studies report that a growing number of minors 
(including UASC) have reverted to ‘survival sex’ to cope with the economic challenges 
of their protracted irregularity.66 This study’s findings seem to echo those of a recent 
study on the impact of the Syrian crisis on the nature of human trafficking in Syria and 
the surrounding region. The report indicates that “much of the exploitation taking place 
is not carried out by organised transnational groups, but rather involves family members, 
acquaintances and neighbours. Families and communities displaced by the war are often 
left with no viable alternatives for survival, other than situations that can be characterised as 
exploitation. The vulnerabilities they are experiencing therefore contribute to the likelihood 
of both exploiting and being exploited”.67 This seems to confirm the situation of many UASC 
interviewed for this report. The need to support their families back in Syria has considerably 
increased their vulnerability and the likelihood of working in dangerous and exploitative 
conditions.
64 Human Rights Watch (2017) Lebanon: Events of 2016
65 Shaheen, K. (2016) The Guardian, Dozens of Syrians forced into sexual slavery in derelict Lebanese house
66 According to UNHCR, ‘survival sex’ or ‘transactional sex’ is “a term used to describe the exchange of sex for material goods or 
protection, or the sale of sex in order to survive. Survival sex is frequently a direct consequence of gaps in assistance, failures of 
registration systems or family separations, and affects men, women, boys and girls”. UNHCR (2014) Woman Alone: The fight for survival 
by Syria’s refugee women; UNHCR (2011) Action against Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: An Updated Strategy
67 ICMPD (2015), Targeting vulnerabilities: The impact of the Syrian war and refugee situation on trafficking in persons
EXPLOITATION
Adnan is a 16 year old Syrian boy from Dara’a. At the age of 13, he was arbitrarily 
detained and tortured in Syria. Thanks to his uncle’s connections, Adnan was temporarily 
released on parole. His uncle suggested that he leave the country and so, aged 15, 
Adnan was driven by his father to the Lebanese border. The father entered Lebanon with 
a hotel reservation (a temporary tourist visa), while Adnan was smuggled into Lebanon 
through the mountains in Bekaa. After 24 hours, the father went back to Syria and Adnan 
was left alone in Beirut with no place to stay, no money, no job and no legal documents 
(legal entry, residency or UNHCR registration). He slept for some time on the beach and 
found work in a grocery shop, but the employer refused to pay him. 
Adnan felt he could not complain to authorities as he had no documents. He refused 
to be placed in a shelter as their rules prohibit minors from working and he needed to 
work to send money back to his family in Syria. In Beirut, he was attacked and beaten 
by a group of men in the street late at night. Again, he did not report the incident, being 
too afraid to approach the police due to his lack of documentation. At the time of this 
research, he was working irregularly in a supermarket and living with other Syrian UASC.
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4.1. Local context 
In 2015, Greece became a key transit country to Europe for refugees and other migrants 
fleeing both immediate danger and economic distress. Hundreds of thousands of 
Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and other foreign nationals entered Greece with 
the goal of traveling along the so-called ‘Balkans route’ towards Northern and Western 
Europe. In March 2016, the situation changed as a result of two key events: the decision 
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYRoM) to seal its border with Greece 
and the inception of the EU-Turkey Agreement, stemming arrivals via the Balkan route. 
This transformation effectively changed Greece from a short-term transit country into a 
potentially long-term host country, a reality that conflicted both with the aspirations of 
stranded asylum seekers and public opinion on migration in Greece. Between March and 
November 2016, the Greek asylum service received 41,741 new claims, a 216% increase 
on 2015 figures. This unprecedented number of asylum applications overwhelmed the 
system and, together with slow relocation and family reunification processes, led to 
protracted delays in claims processing.68 Eight months on, many migrants - including 
UASC - continue to face psychosocial distress and harsh conditions in Greece as they 
await a determination of their claims for asylum, relocation or reunification. The indefinite 
waiting and intolerable state of some of the camps has driven many migrants to consider 
smuggling as an alternative to legal channels of resettlement.
68 Greek Asylum Service (2016) Asylum Statistics November
CHAPTER 4: GREECE
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A significant aspect of recent European migration trends is the number of minors, 315,390, 
according to UNICEF, who have arrived in Greece.69 Data on the number of UASC 
arriving in the country has most likely been obscured by several factors, including fewer 
UASC registering as minors, unaccompanied or separated due to the fear of protective 
custody. Likewise, reports of doubling counting of minors as both accompanied and 
unaccompanied on the part of overwhelmed border agencies in neighbouring fYRoM 
indicate the probable inaccuracy of the fragmented data that is available. Most UASC 
transited through Greece, but a considerable number found themselves stranded. Over 
the course of this research, child protection actors agreed that the number of UASC 
coming to Greece might increase in relative terms in the near future. This trend seems to 
be increasingly understood as a coping strategy by Syrian families in the context of the 
continuation of conflict in their country of origin, the recurrence of political instability in 
the region and the worsening living conditions of Syrians and other refugees and other 
migrants in transit countries. Stranded families are often left with no other viable option 
than to send their children to Europe, hoping for a recognition of their asylum claim and 
the possibility of family reunification. Interestingly, registration of UASC upon arrival in 
Greece has reportedly improved in 2017, due to reduced arrivals and the likelihood that 
minors will register as such in order to claim their right to remain, thereby avoiding return 
to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Agreement.70 
All refugees interviewed during this research had reached Greece from Turkey. 
However, while most other migrants pass through Turkey travelling across the Eastern 
Mediterranean route, displacement patterns to Turkey vary considerably. In this sense, 
migrant countries of origin are not the only determinant in their journeys. Syrians could 
have settled temporarily in Jordan or have travelled directly from Syria; Afghans and 
Pakistanis could have spent a considerable amount of time in Iran or Turkey, in order to 
gather enough money to continue their journeys. Research participants indicated how 
UASC follow similar routes to those of adults in their journeys to and from Greece. Once 
in Turkey, UASC tend to cross overland into Greece or depart on board wooden and 
fibreglass boats, rubber dinghies, fishing boats and large cargo ships. At the time of this 
research, the vast majority of those interviewed indicated that they had reached Greece 
from isolated areas near the Turkish ports of Izmir and Bodrum or, alternatively, had 
arrived via the Evros border crossing from Turkey. 
69 Figures are compiled from a combination of Ministry of Interior (MoI) and UNHCR data. Personal communication with UNICEF 
Knowledge Management Officer, August 2017
70 Ibid.
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There is a lack of comprehensive standardised available data on migrants arriving in the 
EU and data on the number of children who have migrated to Europe and registered, 
as the definition of UASC differs greatly depending on the source. According to a UN 
report,71 the unavailability of accurate data has a detrimental impact on the Greek asylum 
system in dealing with the sheer mass of processing, the irregularity of movements that 
render flows difficult to track and the differences in national and international operating 
procedures and definitions. Discrepancies across data sets and how UASC are defined 
have complicated decision-making of authorities and specialised support provision.72  
4.2 Legal framework
Greece is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967 protocol 
and has ratified the CRC. According to the EU Article 11-3 of the Directive 2013/33/EC1, 
which sets out minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, minors should not 
be detained except under “exceptional circumstances”, and unaccompanied minors must 
be placed in accommodation centres with special provisions for minors.73 On the other 
hand, Greek law does not rule out the detention of unaccompanied minors who enter 
Greece without valid papers, though it does discourage this practice.
4.3. UASC protection challenges and vulnerabilities
Age assessment
Interviews with practitioners revealed serious concerns over the disregard for child 
safeguards, defined by recent ministerial decisions, that have been inconsistently 
implemented by the Hellenic police and relevant actors in charge of the UASC age 
assessment process. In Greece, specific procedures have been drafted to assess the 
age of minors who enter the country unaccompanied. In 2016, following a Joint Ministerial 
Decision (JMD) between the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Health (MoH), 
it was expressly stated that these procedures must take into account the “gender-specific 
characteristics and cultural particularities” of the individuals under examination.74 The 
legal provisions also outlined the rights of the individuals to the presumption of minority, 
informed consent, the use of the least invasive method for age assessment and refusal 
without any impact on procedure results. 
In practice, however, relevant ministerial decisions have been systematically ignored. 
Interviews with practitioners and minors seem to confirm the findings of other reports 
that have raised serious concerns over age assessment procedures for minors.75 Firstly, 
authorities seem to almost exclusively privilege medical examinations over paediatric 
and psychological tests. The former method - generally entailing X-rays and dental 
examinations - is considered by experts as inaccurate and intrusive.76 As a result, the 
probability of doubtful conclusions over someone’s age increases substantially. The 
authorities seem to have effectively inverted a child’s rightful presumption of minority to 
an alleged assumption of age of majority.77 When doubts remain upon completion of the 
71 2016 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends 
in 2016
72 Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) (2017) Underage, Undocumented and Alone: A gap analysis of protection challenges for 
unaccompanied and separated children on the move in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece, June 2017
73 Ec.europa.eu (2013) Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013, which sets out standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection, 29 June 2013
74 269 Joint Ministerial Decision 1982/2016, Gov. Gazette B’335/16-2-2016.
75 Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) (2017) Underage, Undocumented and Alone: A gap analysis of undocumented unaccompanied and 
separated children on the move in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece, June 2017
76 European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2013) Handbook on age assessment practices in Europe, 21 December 2013
77 Age of majority is defined as “the age when a person attains full legal capacity, even if there may still be many things that cannot be 
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age assessment procedure, the person who is examined is considered to be an adult, 
in overt contravention of the principle that says the minority of the child should always 
be presumed. The Greek legal system allows the person(s) in question the possibility to 
challenge this decision; most appeals, however, are rejected. With little or no possibility to 
alter the age determination decision, undocumented minors are at risk of exclusion from 
their right to child protection and exposed to further hardships. The inaccuracy of age 
assessment examinations also increases the statistical margin of error by underestimating 
the number of unaccompanied minors in the country.78 
A recent report highlighted how the length of status determination procedures for 16 
and 17 year old asylum seekers in both Italy and Greece is a concern for minors seeking 
protection, as they fear reaching legal adulthood before the process is completed.79 
Backlogs in age assessment procedures mean that UASC, together with other children, 
are often assumed to be adults and therefore may not be able to access specialised 
support services. 
Protective custody/detention
According to Greek Law, minors should not be detained. Unaccompanied minors “may 
remain in detention as a last resort solution, only to ensure that they are safely referred 
to appropriate accommodation facilities for minors”. This detention “cannot exceed 
twenty-five days”, but “if it is not possible to provide for their safe referral to appropriate 
accommodation facilities, detention may be prolonged for another twenty days. Minors 
who have been separated from their families and unaccompanied minors shall be 
detained separately from adult detainees”.80 
Despite this legal framework, the limited resources of the overstretched reception system 
have led to a different reality. As a result of the provisions of the EU-Turkey Agreement,81 
over 21,000 children - among whom 2,300 were UASC - found themselves stranded in 
Greece.82 As a result, new arrivals have been kept in protective custody, reportedly for 
their own protection.83 Governmental and non-governmental entities have established a 
number of specialised shelters for UASC. These facilities, however, have severely limited 
capacity. Consequently, many minors on the move are held in detention centres (closed 
facilities or police stations) or in open facilities where a larger adult migrant population 
is also detained while awaiting the completion of their asylum process. Not only has the 
administrative detention of UASC been implemented systematically, but the conditions of 
detention are often “unacceptable”.84  
According to the research participants, the past months have witnessed a radical 
improvement in the situation for refugees and other migrants in Greece. The shortening 
of processing times and bureaucratic delays for asylum seekers, as well as the faster 
pace of relocation and more efficient family reunification procedures have all had positive 
done legally or, indeed, many things now in the UK which can be done younger, especially at 16 years. In the UK at the moment the age 
of majority is 18 years.” (n.d.) Collins Dictionary of Law (2006)
78 Ec.europa.eu (2013) Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 26 June 2013, which sets out standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection, 29 June 2013
79 REACH, UNICEF (2017) Children on the Move in Italy and Greece: Italy and Greece, June 2017
80 Article 26 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting 
and withdrawing international protection, 26 June 2013; Article 8-11 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, 26 June 2013
81 fYRoM’s decision to seal its border with Greece, and the EU-Turkey Agreement, seem to have stemmed the flow of people along the 
Balkan route. However, while there are question marks over Turkish capacity and willingness to provide support for the more than two 
million refugees living within its borders, none of the fundamental security, political or economic motivations behind the flow of people 
into the region have been addressed: ensuring the continued demand for smuggling services borne out of conditions of precarity. 
Achilli, L. (2017) Migration Policy Centre (EUI), What Does It Mean to Disrupt the Business Models of People Smugglers?, 9 April 2017
82 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends in 
2016
83 EKKA (2017) Situation Update: Unaccompanied Children (UAC) in Greece, 19 July 2017
84 Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (2016) Country Report: Greece. 2016 Update
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effects, reducing both the time that UASC spend in detention and the congestion at 
reception centres. However, interviews with humanitarian organisations and minors 
show how unaccompanied and separated minors continue to face arbitrary detention 
despite such developments. A lack of adequate shelter, the length of asylum assessment 
procedures and the inaccuracy of the age assessment mechanism still leave minors in 
either protective custody or prolonged detention.85   
Protective custody has fostered a general sense of distrust among UASC towards 
child protection mechanisms: a significant number of children choose not to register as 
minors. The lengthy period of time spent in detention centres, coupled with poor living 
conditions there, directly discourage registration. This includes individuals of 17 years 
or below who have not registered as children because they want to avoid detention. It 
also includes those who believe that the time spent in protective custody will jeopardise 
their chances of moving forward, a belief often encouraged by smugglers. The system of 
protective custody has indirectly encouraged many UASC to avoid the child protection 
system altogether, and to attempt irregular journeys through Greece instead.86 Interviews 
with minors, and actors in charge of their protection, revealed that on many occasions 
allegations of child trafficking do involve minors who left protective custody voluntarily in 
order to rejoin their families in Europe with the help of smugglers. 
Guardianship
According to the Greek civil code, prior to the appointment of a permanent guardian, 
public prosecutors undertake the role of “special temporary guardian” of the minor.87 
However, in violation of this section on the protection and best interests of the child, 
appropriate guardianship has rarely been implemented in practice. According to a 
Safeguard report, public prosecutors are generally poorly informed of the psychosocial 
conditions of the minors to which they are appointed. They are also overwhelmed 
85 Amnesty International (2017) A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal
86 Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. (2017) Harvard University, Emergency within an emergency: The growing epidemic of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of migrant children in Greece, 13 April 2017
87 Greek Civil Code Articles 1589-1654. CARDET, Defence for Children International - Italy et al. (2014) IMPACT, Improving Monitoring and 
Protection Systems Against Child Trafficking and Exploitation, National Report Greece
44
76
56
35 30 27 18
6
27
13
27 22
2
14 15 18 4 15
16 18
280
254
290
311 309
325
305
371
345
368
332
344
286
319 309
277
317
215
178
130
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Number	  of	  UAC	  placed	  in	  Protective	  custody/Reception	  and	  Identification	  Centres
11	  July	  2016	  -­‐ 17	  March	  2017	  (based	  on	  requests	  by	  referral	  agents)
Protective	   custody
Reception	   and	  Identification	   Centres
Source EKKA – National Centre for Social Solidarity (EKKA) (2017) Situation Update: Unaccompanied Children (UAC) 
in Greece, 19 July 2017
Protective
R ceptio  and Identification Centres
Number of UAC placed in Protective custody/Reception and Identification Centres 
11 July 2016 - 17 March 2017 (based on requests by referral agents)
33
O N  M Y  O W N
by large caseloads, and a lack of expertise necessary for carrying out their tasks as 
guardians. More often than not, they limit their role to the mere identification and 
designation of a permanent guardian without any determination of the best interests 
of the child.88 This research has also revealed the arbitrary nature of assigning 
guardianship by the prosecutor which, more often than not, hinders the quality of the 
service and leaves many minors without adequate support. All these shortcomings 
create “fragmented services” and drastic differences in the quality of protection for UASC 
across the country.89 Evidence of good case practice often lies in areas where a smaller 
proportion of minors allows for greater care and attention to be provided through the 
support of local NGOs. Interviews with public prosecutors highlighted the importance of 
a careful dialogue between prosecutors, minors and humanitarian organisations in the 
determination of the best interests of the child. Slow and ineffective coordination between 
these actors has directly increased the time children spend in “protective custody” and 
exacerbated the vulnerability of minors. Informants have pointed out how the forced 
relocation of UASC to specialised shelters and safe areas could result in the loss of social 
networks and the emergence of negative coping mechanisms including selling drugs, 
theft and ‘survival sex’.
Asylum, deportation and relocation 
In 2016, 16,900 children lodged asylum applications in Greece, 2,424 of whom were 
UASC.90 The total quantity of asylum seeker applications received by Greece overloaded 
an already unprepared national system. This caused a severe backlog in registration and 
processing procedures, further increasing the length of the asylum process.91 Asylum 
88 Safeguard Europe (2016) Safeguard: Transnational Report Europe, November 2016
89 Ibid.
90 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends in 
2016
91 Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. (2017) Harvard University, Emergency within an emergency: The growing epidemic of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of migrant children in Greece, 13 April 2017
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grants and denial rates ultimately depend on the nationality of the asylum seeker. Syrians 
- the largest population of children seeking asylum in Greece in 2016 - have the highest 
success rates: 50% of applications are accepted; 2% are rejected; and 48% result in 
subsidiary protection.92 On the other side of the spectrum, Afghans represent the second 
largest population of UASC asking for asylum and the rejection rate stands at 35%, with 
the remaining claims granted either humanitarian status (29%), subsidiary protection (14%), 
or Geneva Convention Status (22%).93  
In 2016, only 165 unaccompanied minors were relocated from Greece, and only 48% of 
pre-registered94 UASC were eligible for relocation programmes.95 The reluctance of other 
European member states to receive the agreed-upon number of refugees, combined 
with challenges posed by the inconsistent implementation of the Dublin Regulation,96 
represent two key factors driving the low numbers of relocations.97 Furthermore, child 
deportation remains a serious protection concern. In April 2016, Amnesty International 
alleged that hundreds of unaccompanied children had been deported to Turkey since 
the beginning of the year.98 Following the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement, 
Greek law has exempted UASC from deportation, as they are considered one of the most 
vulnerable groups.99 This exemption, however, does not apply to accompanied minors, 
44 of whom have been deported with their families since the implementation of the 
Agreement.100    
92 Subsidiary protection is an international protection for persons seeking asylum who do not qualify as refugees. Directive 2004/83/EC 
on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, 29 April 2004
93 2016 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends 
in 2016
94 Between May and July 2016, the Greek Asylum Service implemented a “pre-registration” of refugees and migrants residing on the 
Greek mainland, with the help of UNHCR and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The purpose of this process was to give 
people the opportunity to file an asylum claim in Greece or another European country. Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Interior and 
Administrative Reform, EASO, UNHCR (2016) What is preregistration?
95 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends in 
2016
96 Asylum in Europe, UNHCR, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2009) The Dublin Regulation
97 Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. (2017) Harvard University, Emergency within an emergency: The growing epidemic of sexual exploitation and 
abuse of migrant children in Greece, 13 April 2017
98 Gayle, D. (2016) The Guardian, EU-Turkey refugee plan could be illegal, says UN official, 2 April 2016
99 2016 UNICEF (2017) Refugee and Migrant Children - Including Unaccompanied and Separated Children - in Europe: Overview of Trends 
in 2016
100 Ibid.
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Shelters, safe spaces and communities
According to interviews with NGO staff, the Greek authorities recently communicated to 
the European Commission that the management of UASC shelter programming was due 
to become the responsibility of national institutions by July 2017. Humanitarian actors 
raised serious concerns regarding the tight timeframe for the handover process, the 
challenges in upholding minimum standards for UASC shelters in all facilities, and the 
state of the Greek governmental finances, as delayed payment of national programmes 
risks negatively impacting the provision of services to UASC. This adds to a situation 
that is already far from optimal.103 Availability of space for UASC in Greek shelters is 
101 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
102 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDP), Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National 
Council (KNC) are different Syrian Kurdish opposition groups fighting in Syria.
103 Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) (2017) Underage, Undocumented and Alone: a gap analysis of protection challenges for children on the 
move in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece, June 2017
EU-TURKEY AGREEMENT AND RELOCATION
When Mohammed was interviewed in Veria camp - a refugee camp located southwest 
of Thessaloniki - he was 17 years old and tired of waiting for a relocation that kept being 
postponed. A widespread feeling of boredom was prevalent throughout the camp. 
Mohammed explained how “many people who are bored get tired of waiting and want to 
leave. They don’t want to wait for relocation. It can take a year or more, and even then, it 
is not even certain you will be relocated. They leave with smugglers: it is faster. You pay 
them and you go”.
Mohammed left Syria in early February 2015 when he was 15 years old. He undertook 
the journey with his cousin, who was 17. Both boys came from Al-Hasakah Governorate 
in the northeastern Kurdish region. They are of Kurdish origin, and left because 
Kurdish groups were forcibly recruiting teenagers to fight against ISIS.101 According to 
Mohammed, “it does not really matter what the colour [of the political group] is, or what 
the ideology is that they embrace: PKK, KDP, PYD or KNC102 are all the same! They come 
and take you. And there is nothing you can do about it!” The decision to leave was 
taken in agreement with his family. Both Mohammed’s and his cousin’s families agreed 
they would leave for Europe - Mohammed’s father had already paid for his eldest son to 
leave. Like his brother, Mohammed used the money from his parents to pay smugglers 
along the route. The two boys left for Mercin (Turkey) where they planned to meet their 
uncle and continue their journey.
After a long and dangerous journey through Turkey, during which they successfully met 
up with their uncle, the group arrived in Lesvos. They stayed in the capital of the island, 
Mithilini, for three days, and then took a ferry to Athens, from where they went to the 
north of Greece by bus. At this stage it was already mid-February and fYRoM was about 
to seal its borders with Greece. The group spent around 40 days in Idomeni camp on the 
border waiting for their turn to cross. Idomeni quickly became a sizeable informal camp, 
where many irregular migrants were stranded. When it became clear that the crossing 
was barred for irregular migrants, regardless of nationality, Mohammed and his family 
took the first bus to Veria. Fearing deportation to Turkey, the uncle paid a smuggler for 
his onward journey to fYRoM. Mohammed, on the other hand, had run out of money 
and so decided to wait for relocation, with no guarantee that he would reach his final 
destination. 
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limited. Despite recent efforts to increase the number of appropriate accommodation 
places for UASC, the needs are far from being met. As of July 2017, the number of 
available shelter places was only 1,226, despite the presence of an estimated 2,350 
unaccompanied children in Greece, leaving approximately half of them on EKKA’s waiting 
lists for accommodation referrals. Out of these 1,124 children left without shelter, official 
data only accounts for approximately half of them. Data from EKKA reports that 169 are 
in designated spaces for unaccompanied children (UAC) in open sites (safe zones); 
117 in protective custody in police stations; 246 in reception and identification centres; 
and 159 in temporary accommodation sites.104 The remainder that are unaccounted for 
presumably face considerable protection risks due to a lack of available shelter. It is 
reasonable to think that, despite efforts to increase capacity, there will still be a large gap 
in places available in the near future. The lack of available shelters also affects individuals 
that have recently reached legal adulthood, incurring a sudden loss of support specifically 
for minors and access to safe spaces. In a few instances, NGOs have ensured that 
individuals are accommodated in centres where young men can still receive assistance 
during this transition phase. However, more often than not, becoming an adult is coupled 
with a distinct reduction in an individual’s protection space.
Exploitation
Various human rights agencies have reported ill-treatment and violence against refugees 
and migrants, including UASC, by the national authorities.106 Limited reception places in 
hotspots, inhumane and inappropriate conditions in detention facilities and the exclusion 
of UASC from cash transfer programmes107 expose UASC to increased risks of trafficking, 
child abuse and sexual exploitation. UASC are particularly at risk of physical and sexual 
violence in the harsh conditions of the camps, where a large number of child abuse cases 
go unreported.108 Interviews with minors and NGO staff have revealed that ‘transactional 
sex’ and ‘survival sex’ have become common coping mechanisms for children arriving 
104 EKKA (National Centre for Solidarity) (2017) Situation Update: Unaccompanied Children (UAC) in Greece, 19 July 2017
105 Ibid.
106 Centre for the Advancement of Research and Development in Educational Technology (CARDET), Defence for Children International 
- Italy et al. (2014) IMPACT, Improving Monitoring and Protection Systems Against Child Trafficking and Exploitation, National Report 
Greece
107 Ibid.
108 FXB Centre for Health and Human Rights, Harvard University (2016) A Harsh New Reality: Transactional Sex Among Refugee Minors as 
a Means of Survival in Greece
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in Greece from the Middle East. Limited appropriate shelter availability, the lack of legal 
income opportunities and the length of the asylum procedures were cited as the root 
causes of coping mechanisms that lead to the sexual exploitation and abuse of UASC. 
A number of newspaper articles reported cases of minors resorting to transactional sex 
as a means of survival on the streets of Athens, a phenomenon which is seemingly more 
common among Afghan UASC.109 A report on the practice of transactional sex among 
UASC confirms that the phenomenon is common both in rural and urban areas and that all 
minors in such situations of vulnerability are at risk, regardless of sex or nationality.110 This 
research appears to confirm that the recent tightening of border control between Greece 
and fYRoM has exacerbated this trend: whereas before, UASC turned to ‘transactional 
sex’ to finance their onward journey via smuggling routes, this has increasingly become a 
survival mechanism among children and adolescents still stranded in Greece.111  
109 Refugees Deeply (2016) Refugees Caught Up in Child Prostitution in Athens, 14 July 2016
110 FXB Centre for Health and Human Rights, Harvard University (2016) A Harsh New Reality: Transactional Sex Among Refugee Minors as 
a Means of Survival in Greece
111 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5: PUTTING THE “CHILD” 
      IN CHILD PROTECTION
Article 3 of the CRC states that “in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”. This 
should be the case in all actions relating to UASC, regardless of their status in a given 
territory. However, for a variety of reasons, children’s voices are often not heard. There 
is a clear absence of input from children when migration decision-makers determine 
‘best interests’ of the child. This subverts the ‘child rights approach’ endorsed by the 
CRC, which formally and explicitly recognises children as having rights. Though difficult 
to define, ‘participation’ might best be regarded as the process of sharing power with 
the people most affected by the decisions made on their behalf. Considering children’s 
participation - as actors with a voice in discussions regarding their own vulnerability - 
requires a considerable shift in societal and organisational structures, and in cultural 
attitudes toward the minor. 
This research in Jordan, Lebanon and Greece highlights how two factors contribute to 
the fundamental disregard for this aspiration and have ultimately led to the existence 
of flawed protection mechanisms put in place by the international community. Firstly, 
interviews with key stakeholders have revealed the widespread belief among authorities 
that UASC are a potential security threat; the general idea being that children are 
easier to indoctrinate and could more easily fall prey to terrorist groups such as Daesh. 
Accordingly, research participants pointed out how UASC - especially in Lebanon and 
Jordan - were often perceived by authorities as potential criminals, a perception that 
led to the systematic violations of their rights, including their immediate deportation and 
detention. This approach is perhaps most clearly embodied in the concept of protective 
custody/detention, which takes primacy over the protection needs, objectives and 
aspirations of the minors in question.
Secondly, the findings of this research confirm the findings of studies that have shown 
how the factual disregard for UASC voices might be embedded in the dominant approach 
to child protection. Examination of the conceptualisation of the best interests of the child 
by the CRC in recent decades has suggested that children are often sidelined when 
international actors determine what is best for them. Numerous studies have shown 
how international programmes have often interpreted the best interests of the child in 
terms of reflecting the priorities of donor countries rather than the child’s own interests.112 
According to this literature, the CRC universalises a Western conception of childhood that 
erodes individual autonomy and promotes dependency on professional intervention.113 
112 Pupavac, V. (2001) Misanthropy Without Borders: The International Children’s Rights Regime. Disasters, 25(2): 95–112; Cantwell, N. (2014) 
UNICEF, The Best Interests of the Child in Intercountry Adoption
113 Boyden, J. (1990) Childhood and the Policy Makers: A Comparative Perspective on the Globalization of Childhood; James, A. and 
Prout, A. (eds.) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. Falmer, 
London; Lewis, N. (1998) Human Rights, Law and Democracy in an Unfree World; and Evans, T. (ed.) Human Rights, Fifty Years On: A 
Reappraisal. Manchester University Press, Manchester. According to these studies, international standards on children rights are based 
on the assumption that children’s needs, development and best interests are uncontested universal concepts that could (and should) 
be applied in all contexts. The childhood development model proposed by the CRC is based on a Western conceptualisation. This 
conceptualisation underestimates the impact of cultural, social, economic and political factors and focuses on individual processes and 
specialised management.
39
O N  M Y  O W N
The CRC was borne out of an era of humanitarian assistance that was largely 
characterised by a “top-down”, paternalistic approach to such agreements, as opposed 
to one that promotes the agency and capabilities of minors.114 This is evident through 
the prevailing tendency among authorities and the international community in Greece to 
enact ‘appropriate care provision’ for UASC by endorsing the use of protective custody. 
The latter can be seen as administrative detention and has, at times, led to the disruption 
of social relationships and the exacerbation of children’s vulnerability.
This lack of participation of UASC in decision-making that affects their lives makes it 
difficult to recognise that their migration decisions are often taken for reasons similar to 
those of adults, and has curbed their (legal) mobility, thereby increasing their vulnerability 
to exploitation. For example, research in this area shows that when channels of legal 
mobility diminish, the likelihood of UASC getting involved in smuggling and trafficking 
increases dramatically. It has been claimed that 20% of unaccompanied minors in Greece 
disappear from reception centres within 24 hours of their placement there.115 The average 
stay is only 60 days, which raises questions about the role reception centres play in 
providing safe spaces for UASC. Furthermore, there are countless reported incidents 
of UASC working for smuggling groups. UASC are employed to escort migrants across 
the border because of their own first-hand knowledge of the route, to directly recruit 
clients, or to help provide the various services needed by migrants (such as food or 
accommodation) because of their long-term relationship with local communities in the 
transit countries. They do this work in order to pay the required fees or to have a decent 
livelihood, or most likely because there was no viable alternative in order to survive - as 
evidenced by the interviews for this research. It is hard to say whether these people were 
the exploited, the exploiters, both or neither. What these interviews ultimately tell us is 
that the programmes and policies developed to protect children from violence, abuse and 
exploitation might infringe upon their mobility and leave them at risk of harm.
Regardless of their circumstances and the reasons for which they are on the move, 
unaccompanied and separated children are often exposed to considerable risks and 
dangers. UASC, however, are not by default more at risk than their adult counterparts. 
Recent research has demonstrated how mobility provides UASC with a source of 
empowerment and one of the few available paths to social adulthood. In order to further 
advance a child protection approach, one should recognise not only the vulnerabilities to 
which UASC are exposed but also acknowledge their agency. Such an approach should 
recognise their resilience, their right to empowerment and skills. Moreover, the possibility 
that their autonomous journey could actually provide them with the occasion to improve 
their livelihood strategies and future prospects should be acknowledged. Protection 
actors working with children on the move should take into account the potential positive 
outcome that mobility can produce in children’s lives throughout the migration process. 
The very concept of vulnerability needs to be considered within a proper context, taking 
into consideration the age of UASC, level of maturity, socio-cultural background and 
personal views. For example, separated children face a different range of vulnerabilities 
to those of unaccompanied minors, such as abuse and exploitation at the hands of family 
members and as a result of challenging socio-cultural family dynamics in the context 
of displacement. In this sense, the opinion of the child should be at the centre of any 
assessment regarding best interests and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
protection mechanisms in place. This would also entail a rethinking of the category of 
“child”. According to Article 1 of the CRC, a child is every human being below the age of 
114 Stoecklin, D. (2014) Children’s Rights and the Capability Approach: Challenges and Prospects, 14 July 2014
115 Fili, A. (2014) Unaccompanied Minors in Greece: Passing on the Responsibility
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18 years, regardless of his/her level of maturity, unless the laws applicable to the child in 
a given country state otherwise. However, several studies have demonstrated how this 
definition can obscure the vulnerability as well as the capabilities of an individual.116 This 
is particularly important in light of the fact that many unaccompanied minors will continue 
to move, reside or work irregularly, with or without humanitarian protection. As one Syrian 
child worker living near an ITS in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon told us: “I don’t want to be 
put in a shelter, I just want to be able to work freely without being stopped and detained 
by the government”. 
116 Hashim and Thorsen, for example, show that the western category of “childhood” is of little use in many African societies where 
adulthood is embedded in social relations and generational hierarchies rather than in chronological age and cognitive development. 
Iman Hashim, Dorte Thorsen (2011) Child Migration in Africa, The Nordic Africa Institute, Zed Books, London, New York
41
O N  M Y  O W N
JORDAN
Findings in Jordan are unique in comparison to the other country contexts of Lebanon 
and Greece for several reasons. Firstly, as set out in the methodology section, a lack of 
accessible data or understanding on the presence of UASC entering the country led to 
a refocusing of the research approach towards family separation of minors as a result 
of documentation complexities. This research indicates that child rights stipulated in 
the CRC continue to be violated across a range of thematic areas. Despite reassuring 
developments in child protection legislation to better align Jordan’s frameworks with 
international standards, tightening registration policies and inconsistent implementation 
at the state level, coupled with a lack of institutional capacity, have created considerable 
protection challenges for displaced minors across the country - the large refugee 
population hosted by the country has put its institutions under further strain. 
The interviews conducted for this research confirmed the findings of prior studies, which 
indicated growing rates of forced encampment and deportation of minors to Syria as a 
result of a restrictive regularisation environment, and ensuing documentation complexities 
incurred by labour violations of minors attempting to support their families financially. 
The separation of minors from their families that takes place as a result of such legal 
status challenges is further compounded by the difficulty in reunifying undocumented 
children with family members also residing irregularly in host communities. It is here that 
humanitarian and state protection actors face little option other than to violate the best 
interests of the child, given the lack of alternative legal recourse. The complexities of 
Jordan’s existing camp registration and temporary leave/bail-out system117 contribute to 
a higher prevalence of negative coping mechanisms as a result of families’ irregularity, 
including increased early marriage, child labour and premature abandonment of 
education. Minors are consequently at risk of arbitrary administrative detention or ‘child 
rights approach’, a conclusion that was confirmed by our research interviewees, though 
the explicit scale of such refoulement remains unclear. 
Despite a lack of explicit data on numbers of UASC entering or residing in Jordan, it 
is evident that access to education, healthcare, guardianship or foster care are again 
problematised for this group by the same legal documentation and status complexities 
faced by those entering the country as accompanied minors. According to our 
consultations with protection specialists, this is particularly the case for UASC residing 
irregularly in the country, outside of the vicinity of formal camps. This deficiency in UASC-
specific data could also be indicative of a poor understanding of inconsistencies in 
registration of such minors entering Jordan, either as ‘adults’ or as members of families 
to which they bear no blood relation; confirmation of such anecdotal information through 
further research could provide valuable insights. 
117 The bail-out procedure is an official process by which refugees could previously obtain permission to leave camps and reside within 
host communities. Obtaining such permission is only possible upon fulfilment of certain requirements, including the presence of a 
relative of Jordanian nationality that can act as a sponsor, over the age of 35, residing outside the camp. Conflicting reports provide 
differing information on whether or not the bail-out process is still underway, having supposedly been suspended in January 2015 and 
replaced with a temporary leave permit system that requires the eventual return of registered refugees to the camp territories. UNHCR 
is still reporting on such figures, indicating that the process has resumed; however, numbers still remain unclear.
CHAPTER 5.1: CONCLUSION
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LEBANON
Despite a differing context to Jordan, legal status challenges are likewise at the crux 
of protection concerns for UASC in Lebanon. As confirmed by the research findings, 
recent restrictive changes to entry criteria for displaced Syrians have created a climate 
of irregularity for UASC in particular. Despite the legal obligation to regularise their status 
following irregular entry (considering extremely limited channels for legal entry), UASC are 
faced with a distinct lack of available pathways to do so, due to criteria that demand the 
presence of an adult relative for legal entry and/or stay. 
This state of irregularity compounds the vulnerability of UASC on several fronts. According 
to this research, fear of detention has actively discouraged this group from seeking 
assistance from the humanitarian community or reporting abuses at the hands of security 
forces or irregular employers. For these same reasons, our interviewees reported avoiding 
school due to the risk of crossing GSO checkpoints en route. Because an adult presence 
is required if a minor wants to legally rent a property, UASC reported residing in large 
groups in makeshift accommodation that exposes them to physical protection risks and 
potential exploitation by landlords. Negative coping mechanisms are therefore common, 
encompassing ‘survival sex’ and situations of exploitative child labour. These factors 
ultimately place UASC at the heart of a continuous cycle of migration status violations and 
exploitation, for which there is currently no legal remedy. 
As outlined by those interviewed, the capacity of key protection institutions such as 
UPEL - together with a lack of shelter, formal foster care or adoption frameworks - mean 
there is little by way of a protective safety net for those attempting to survive when living 
unaccompanied or separated in Lebanon. In addition, rising intercommunity tensions 
stemming from the tense socio-economic climate, which is compounded by the number of 
Syrian refugees Lebanon hosts, do not make life easier for UASC in Lebanon.    
GREECE
The legislative protection environment for UASC entering Greece is considerably more 
developed than in the contexts of Jordan and Lebanon. Directives and procedural 
safeguards at both the European and the national level provide for explicit protection for 
UASC, and more generally minors, throughout the entry and asylum process. Nonetheless, 
violations of child rights expressly outlined in the CRC, particularly around the age 
assessment process, continue to place UASC at risk of arbitrary administrative detention, 
exposure to the most invasive medical examinations, sexual and financial abuse and the 
presumption of adulthood, all of which threaten their access to specialised support services. 
Despite promising developments at the national level in recent years that would improve 
protection-based legislation, in relation to the age determination process specifically, the 
research findings indicate a widespread inconsistency in implementation of specified steps. 
In the midst of this often lengthy and invasive determination process, UASC in Greece face 
a chronic lack of shelter and an institutional approach that directly impacts their access 
to the guardianship and representation afforded them under both European and Greek 
asylum law. As reflected in the other country case studies, a lack of harmonised data 
collection directly feeds into inadequate service provision and allocation of resources, and 
poor coordination between the local, national and international procedural levels as regards 
protection of UASC. Furthermore, and as is the case in both Lebanon and Jordan, shifting 
entry policies along the eastern Mediterranean route have led to an increased prevalence 
of negative coping mechanisms among UASC. This is confirmed, for instance, in increased 
reports amongst respondents of the use of ‘survival’ or ‘transactional sex’.
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6.1 Jordan
Access to services
 Government of Jordan
• Pending regularisation, ensure that all UASC, regardless of location, can access 
essential assistance (specifically healthcare) and formal education regardless of 
their registration status
• Access to legal documentation - and hence to services - should be facilitated for 
UASC in general and for separated children under legal guardianship or foster 
care in particular
• Family members of individuals facing deportation orders should be allowed 
access to humanitarian actors for the provision of protection and assistance 
information to facilitate informed decisions
 Humanitarian actors
• Raise awareness of available services for UASC amongst host and refugee 
communities
• Conduct protection monitoring focusing on the cultural, integration and gender 
issues faced by separated children under legal guardianship or foster care to help 
identify protection concerns to better inform humanitarian assistance
• Implement projects addressing access to shelter issues for UASC
• Provide additional resources for youth access to health education in the camps 
and in host communities
• Ensure UASC with disabilities can access specialised services
• Increase UASC access to psychosocial support
• Prioritise UASC residing in ITS due to significant barriers in accessing basic 
services
• Ensure UASC receive adequate psychosocial support in Azraq camp, especially in 
Village 5 where large numbers reside
Child labour and exploitation
 Government of Jordan
• Ensure national legislation and its implementation continues to develop in line 
with the CRC principle of the best interests of the child
• Strengthen support of social protection programmes and assistance to address 
specific needs of children at risk of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) 
and SGBV survivors
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS
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 Humanitarian actors
• Expand outreach, awareness raising and protection for those who report abuse 
and exploitation in order to reduce and eliminate cases
• Prioritise cash modalities as a tool for UASC protection. Increased access to 
income would reduce resorting to negative coping mechanisms
• Offer vocational training to UASC
• Conduct focus groups discussions with UASC to better understand their needs 
and interests
• Conduct further research to better understand why some Syrian refugees do not 
want to obtain work permits (known reasons include the fear of losing access to 
assistance or resettlement, the ability to obtain informal work without a permit, 
and that permits may not provide protection against exploitation and abuse in 
workplaces)
• Distinguish strategies in response to child labour between ITS, camp and host 
community environments due to the unique protection challenges present in each 
area
Legal status and documentation
 Government of Jordan
• Strengthen the ongoing Urban Verification Exercise (UVE) to ensure 
comprehensive access for UASC to services, expand self-reliance and legal work 
and slow the growth of the undocumented UASC population
• UASC potentially subject to deportation should have an opportunity to contest the 
evidence against them, through judicial review
• UASC apprehended by police should be reunited with their families in line with 
the best interests of the child, instead of forcible separation from their families and 
relocation to Azraq camp reception areas
 Humanitarian actors
• Raise awareness of the legal framework of Jordan with regard to children’s rights, 
labour law and the employment of minors
6.2. Lebanon
Shelter and alternative care
 Government of Lebanon
• Provide child protection-sensitive practice training courses to the Internal Security 
Forces (ISF), as the first point of contact with UASC
• Ensure the presence of a lawyer to assist UASC detained in police stations, if 
UPEL social workers are unavailable
• Promote clear selection criteria for residential care
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 Humanitarian actors
• Advocate for the availability of child-friendly waiting rooms at the ISF premises
• Raise awareness within the government of alternative care options
• Establish an oversight mechanism containing monitoring procedures for 
alternative care
Child labour and exploitation
 Government of Lebanon
• Provide ISF, border patrols and those working directly with UASC with capacity 
building and training on adequate and safe assessment of UASC
• Identify alternatives to detention and arrest
• Ease restrictions on movement for 15-17 year old UASC to enable their access to 
services
• Abolish the curfew system imposed discretionally by some municipalities
 Humanitarian actors
• Integrate livelihoods and education programming, for instance via vocational 
opportunities that prioritise UASC
• Empower women in female-headed households of separated children through 
cash assistance and skills training
• Negotiate with shawish and employers to mitigate the impact of child labour
Legal status and documentation
 Government of Lebanon
• Establish a mechanism with juvenile judges that does not depend on each judge 
but surpasses judiciary appointments and harmonises the approach to focus on 
protection rather than the irregularity of residency permits
 Humanitarian actors
• Harmonise the approach of UN bodies and partners in addressing the needs 
of UASC and establish an inter-agency referral mechanism that takes into 
consideration the specific vulnerabilities and challenges faced by UASC
6.3. Greece
First screening and age assessment
 Government of Greece
• Provide adequate training to immigration officials to identify signs of abuse 
and exploitation among new UASC arrivals, and to sensitively verify kinship 
relationships of children on the move
• Ensure child protection officer presence at hotspots, during the registration phase 
and in all reception facilities hosting UASC
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• Ensure the age assessment process follows procedure, taking into account the 
child’s mental well-being and avoiding all risks of violation of physical integrity
Protective custody/detention
 Government of Greece
• Ensure detention of UASC who enter the country irregularly is always a last resort 
measure and occurs for the shortest period of time necessary
• Appoint trained and independent translators to facilitate effective communication
• If transfer to community-based apartments is not an option, move UASC away 
from the general population to child-friendly spaces within camps
Guardianship, shelter and alternative care
 Government of Greece
• Provide adequate training to guardians to safeguard the best interests of UASC 
and strengthen the legal guardianship system to immediately appoint well-trained 
individuals
 Humanitarian actors
• Increase the number of shelters or community-based apartments for UASC so as 
to provide alternatives to administrative detention
Asylum, deportation and relocation 
 Government of Greece
• Ensure that UASC receive accurate, timely and accessible information regarding 
their rights and the support available to them
• Improve family tracing and family reunification procedures, always prioritising 
UASC
Exploitation and abuse
 Government of Greece
• Establish specialised shelters to assist UASC victims of exploitation and abuse
• Provide child-centred training to authorities who interact with vulnerable UASC
 Humanitarian actors
• Increase the awareness and understanding of the local community in order to 
facilitate the detection and prevention of exploitation of UASC
• Establish telephone hotlines for UASC victims of exploitation and abuse
• Raise awareness among UASC on the risks of exploitation and abuse as well as 
the available protective resources
• Prioritise cash modalities as a tool for UASC protection in order to reduce 
negative coping mechanisms

